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Abstract: 
Some economies in the Former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe (FSU&CEE) are 
known as cybercrime hotspots. FSU&CEE economies have shown complex and varied responses 
to cybercrimes due partly to the differential incentives and pressures they face. This study builds 
upon literatures on white-collar crime, institutional theory and international relations 
(IR)/international political economy (IPE) perspectives to examine the low rates of prosecution 
and conviction of suspected cybercriminals in some economies in the FSU&CEE and variation 
in such rates across these economies. The findings indicate that cybercrime cases are more likely 
to be prosecuted and sanctions are imposed in economies that are characterized by a higher 
degree of cooperation and integration with the West. Cybercriminals are less likely to be 
jurisdictionally shielded in such economies. Our findings also suggest that a high degree of 
cooperation and integration with the West would lead to access to resources to enhance system 
capacity and law enforcement performance to fight cybercrimes. 
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Introduction 
 
Some economies in the Former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe (FSU&CEE) have 
become top cybercrime hotspots. According to Merchant Risk Council, six of the top ten 
economies from which most online frauds originated in the early 2000s were from FSU&CEE 
[99]. An estimate suggested that, in 2004, there were over 50 gangs of professional 
cybercriminals in these economies [42]. 
Cybercrime rings in some FSU&CEE economies have mastered complex tricks. Sophisticated 
frauds involving a complex fusion of strategy, technology, processes, and people such as cyber-
extortion, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and hijacking users’ searches and clicks 
are associated with these economies. Corruption, the lack of sufficiently high penalties, 
ineffective, inefficient, inadequate, and weak legislation and lax law enforcement have fueled 
cybercrime in these economies [57]. 
Key private sector players have also allegedly encouraged cybercrimes. For instance, ISPs in the 
region arguably have no vested interest in fighting spam as doing so would decrease their 
revenue [80]. According to the anti-spam organization, Spamhaus, the Russian domain name 
registrar NAUNET allegedly harbored cybercriminals 
(http://www.spamhaus.org/news/article/680/). 
In response to FSU&CEE- originated cybercrimes, institutional changes are taking place in the 
West. The U.S. State Department, for instance, provides instruction and training to employees on 
security, especially securing devices in Russia and China [84]. 
Criminologists have emphasized the need to understand the causes and motivations of frauds 
against consumers against the backdrop of rapid growth in such frauds transcending international 
boundaries [47]. Prior researchers have also suggested that an understanding of the structure of 
opportunity associated with white-collar crimes would help take countermeasures to prevent 
such crimes [13]. This argument is equally valid for cybercrimes. 
The salient feature of FSU&CEE economies, from our perspective, the rates at which suspected 
cybercriminals are investigated, apprehended, prosecuted, and convicted are low in these 
economies, as in most economies. Since cybercrimes in many aspects are similar to white-collar 
crimes, it is logical to draw upon the literature on white-collar offenses. Prior researchers have 
suggested three explanations that may account for the low rates of prosecutions and convictions 
and differential treatment of white-collar offenders: organizational advantage argument, 
alternative sanctions argument and system capacity argument [46,86,94,105]. This article 
attempts to examine these explanations and associated mechanisms in more detail in the context 
of cybercrime by drawing upon institutional theory and international relations (IR)/international 
political economy (IPE) perspectives. 
The paper is structured as follows. We proceed by first examining relevant theories and concepts. 
Next, we analyze the nature, extent and impact of cybercrimes associated with the region. Then, 
we investigate the push and pull factors related to cybercrimes. It is followed by a section on 
case studies of some firms from the region engaged in cybercrimes. Following this is a section 
institutional and IR/IPE explanations regarding FSU&CEE economies’ approaches to 
cyberspace. The final section provides discussion and implications. 
Relevant theories and concepts 
 
Differential treatment of white-collar offenders 
 
As is the case of most emerging economies, rates of prosecution and conviction are low for 
cyber-offenders in many FSU&CEE economies. For instance, prosecutions related to cybercrime 
are vanishingly low at 5–6 people a year in Russia [106]. Likewise, according to the Interior 
Ministry of Ukraine, 400 people were arrested in the country for Internet and banking fraud 
charges during 2002–2011 but only eight were convicted [80]. While hard data are difficult to 
obtain, more internationally integrated CEE economies are expected to have higher prosecution 
and conviction rates. What factors explain the fact that, only a small proportion of cyber-
offenders are prosecuted and most go unpunished in some FSU&CEE economies? What are the 
sources of regional variation in the prosecution and conviction rates of cyber-offenders? 
The literatures on the white-collar crime could be particularly helpful for identifying important 
micro-level causes and dynamics associated with individuals’ engagement in cybercrime 
activities. Based upon the related literature of white-collar offenders [46,86,94,105], three 
explanations can be offered regarding the differential treatment of cyber-offenders. According to 
an organizational advantage argument, offenders that are in “organizationally shielded” positions 
receive more lenient treatment. Hagan and Parker [46] analysis of securities fraud in Canada 
indicated that employers were less likely to be prosecuted under criminal statutes than were 
offenders in lower-class positions. The authors concluded that organizational structure of 
corporations embedded class advantage in such a way that employers were often shielded from 
prosecution. 
According to an alternative sanctions argument, civil sanctions may replace criminal sanctions in 
the response to white-collar crimes. Shapiro [94] study of violators of securities law in the U.S 
indicated a higher tendency to prosecute lower-status offenders than higher-status ones. Her 
analysis, however, indicated that the variation in prosecutions and sanctions across different 
levels of status was due to the availability of alternative sanctions in cases involving higher-
status offenders and was not because of a class bias. 
Finally the system capacity argument maintains that the legal response to suspected crime is a 
function of organizational resources and caseload pressures [86]. Resource limitations are of 
particular concern for white-collar crimes due to their complexity, which require substantial 
amounts of investigative and prosecutorial efforts [105]. 
It is recognized, however, that the three explanations above provide complementary rather than 
mutually exclusive interpretation regarding the differential treatment of white-collar offenders. 
For instance, prior research indicates that the limited capacity of criminal justice agencies due to 
the complexity and hidden nature of white-collar crime and the system overload caused by such 
crimes reduces state capacity to respond to such crimes [12]. Likewise, due to the difficulty 
involved in obtaining direct evidence against high level criminals that are “organizationally 
shielded”, system capacity limitations may lead to prosecution of lower-level employees, for 
whom it is easier to locate the evidence [105]. 
Institutional and IR/ IPE perspectives 
 
The institutional and IR/ IPE perspectives would help us understand the macro picture of 
cybercrime associated with FSU&CEE economies by providing further insights into low rates of 
prosecution and conviction for cyber-offenders in some of these economies, and variation in such 
rates. Prior researchers have recognized that economic activities and actors are embedded in 
formal and informal institutions [44,83]. The nature of activities of cybercriminals fits squarely 
with what Baumol [8] calls destructive entrepreneurship. Baumol hypothesized that the 
distribution of productive, unproductive, and destructive entrepreneurs is a function of the 
“relative payoffs” offered to these activities by the society’s “rules of the game”. These rules are 
referred as institutions [77]. 
In light of the cross-border nature of most serious cybercrime activities, it is also important to 
understand the importance of cyber-security issue from the IR/IPE perspective. A large body of 
literature indicates that with the decline of violent geopolitical conflicts, traditional issues such as 
nuclear war are losing salience and the focus and organizing principle in international relations 
have been on nontraditional security issues [3,25,110]. Cyber-threat is increasingly recognized as 
a legitimate security issue because cyber-attacks present threats to national security for the 
simple fact that most of the critical infrastructures are connected to the Internet [60,61]. This 
issue is also tightly linked to economic security of countries. 
Assessing the nature, extent and impact of cybercrimes associated with the FSU&CEE 
 
Cybercrimes originated in the FSU&CEE economies share two important characteristics. First, a 
significant proportion of them are linked with organized crimes [38], which is clearly 
demonstrated many large-scale entrepreneurial initiatives (see Cases 1–3 and Table 1). 
Cybercrime groups in FSU&CEE are well-known for efficient global teams and supply chain 
management, best adaptive global strategies, effective incentive structures and meaningful global 
collaborations [43]. For instance, IT security analysts observed that a large number of people are 
required to run the Rustock botnet (Table 1; [9]). More broadly, most economic and financial 
crimes in Russia and other former Soviet Union economies are associated with organized crime 
groups [62]. 
Table 1 
Some examples of notable international cybercrime networks associated with the FSU&CEE 
economies 
Malware/Crime 
gang Active in Operations Remarks 
Conficker 
Last 
reported: 
2010 
Controlled 7 m computer systems at 230 
regional and ccTLDs. Bandwidth capacity: 28 tb/sec 
Pushdo/Cutwail 
2009–
2010 
100,000 bots (40 % in India), 30 C&C servers 
in Europe, North America, Russia 
> 1.7 trillion e-mails in 
15 months 
Rustock 
2006–
Q12011 
2.5 million computers (2010, peak), Operated 
from Russia Peak: > 50 % of global spam 
ShadowCrew 
(Clearinghouse for 
cards, document) 
2004–
2005 
4,000 members in Bulgaria, Canada, Poland, 
Sweden, the U. S. and others, 1.7 million 
stolen card no., $4.3 million losses 
Masterminds arrested in six 
countries including the U.S. 
Zeus 
Since 
2007 
1.6 million attacks (2010Q1) (15 % of 
malware attacks) 
2011Q1: 44 % of all financial 
malware infections. 
Stole 70million(attempted220 million) by 
Sept. 2010 in the U.S., over $9 million in 
3 months in the U.K. 
Sept. 2010: arrests of 92 
members in the U.S., 19 in the 
U.K., 5 in Ukraine. 
> 500 C&C servers in Russia, the U.S., 
Romania, and Ukraine. 
Early 2010: botnet of 100,000 PCs. 
GhostMarket Forum 2009 
8,000 members selling Zeus, manufacturing 
crystal meth and bomb-making. 
Used a bank account in Costa 
Rica to process funds. Losses from credit details: £16.2 million. 
Mpack 2007 
May 2007: compromised > 160,000 
computers. Mpack kit: sold for 700–1,000. 
Coreflood 
2002–
2011 Controlled > 2.3 m PCs. 
April, 2011: U.S. DoJ and FBI 
seized C&C servers. 
Malware/Crime 
gang Active in Operations Remarks 
Theft: > $100 million. 
evolved with > 100 updates 
3/2009–1/2010: a C&C server held 190 GB 
of data from > 400,000 victim computers. 
Bredolab 
May 
2009–
Oct. 2010 
Infected 3 million PCs/month (controlled up 
to 29 million PCs). An Armenian arrested. 
3.6 billion spam e-mails daily containing the 
malware 
Dutch authorities seized 143 
servers. 
Innovative 
Marketing Ukraine 
(IMU) 
2003–
2009 
> 600 employees in Kiev/ subsidiaries in 
India, Poland, Canada, U.S. and Argentina. 
Incorporated in Belize, main 
offices in Kiev 
Sold programs in > two dozen countries, 
generated US$ 180 million (2008). 
Credit card payments handler: 
Bank of Bahrain & Kuwait, 
Singapore’s DBS Bank. 
Call centers in Ukraine, India 
and the U.S. 
Blackhole 
Since 
2011 
Arguably the most commonly detected 
malware family in 2012H1 
Believed to be developed by 
Russian hackers 
Flashback 2012 
Estimated to infect 550,000–600,000 Macs at 
its peak. 
Believed to be created by the 
Russian gang which created 
the MacDefender malware in 
2011 [32,78]. 
Rove Digital 
(Domain Name 
Server (DNS) 
changer) 
2006–
2011 
Hijacked > 4 million computers in over 100 
countries, generated > $14 million in profits. 
The group had 100 C&C servers worldwide 
including one each in New York and 
Chicago. 
The gang included six 
Estonians and one Russian. 
Nov. 2011: dismantled by U.S. 
federal agencies. The two-year 
FBI investigation was 
codenamed “Operation Ghost 
Click”. 
 
 
Second, unlike their counterparts in other parts of the world, cybercriminals in some FSU&CEE 
economies pursue business models that offer quick monetization. For instance, stolen financial 
information is more easily converted into cash than trade secrets [111]. Likewise, cyber-offenses 
involving the creation of fake profiles on social networking (SN) sites in some FSU economies 
have monetization aspects. In Armenia, for instance, criminals reportedly open SN accounts with 
the names of different people and use them to distribute pornography. They then extort money to 
eliminate such pages [76]. This is in contrast to the approaches followed by cyber-offenders in 
India and the Middle East, where fake SN profiles are often created to defame and malign the 
victim. 
We consider two internationally known cybercrime hot spots: Russia and Ukraine. 
Cybercrimes in Russia 
 
According to some estimates 10,000–20,000 people in Russia work in “dark side” activities such 
as engaging in bank frauds, selling scareware and sending fake pharmacy spam [65]. Various 
aspects of cybercrime in Russia and their enforcement are fascinating, puzzling, controversial 
and complex. Russian hacking rings and organized crime networks have reportedly collaborated 
with criminals groups with other countries. For instance, Russian hacking rings allegedly helped 
Japanese gangs to attack law-enforcement agencies’ databases [103] and worked with Australian 
scammers to transfer stolen money from overseas banks [40]. Malaysia’s HeiTech Padu 
Berhad’s director noted that Russian organized crime groups financially sponsored the country’s 
cybercriminals [49]. An employee of an anti-virus company allegedly engaged in virus creation. 
A number of recent high-profile cybercrimes are allegedly traced to Russia. For instance, in the 
widely publicized coreflood case, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 
Department of Justice (DoJ) filed a civil complaint against 13 “John Doe defendants”, believed 
to be in Russia. The Koobface malware, which started in 2008 by sending fake messages on 
Facebook and other SN sites reportedly originated in Russia. The infected machines were 
flooded with ads for gray products such as fake antivirus software. Victims’ searches were also 
“hijacked” to deliver traffic to rouge websites [111]. 
Cybercrimes in Ukraine 
 
Some analysts maintain that Ukraine is ahead of Russia in cybercrime ([80], quoting Trend 
Micro’s Paul Ferguson). Some Ukrainian elites have publicly admitted that the country’s 
cybercriminals have been threats to the world. Valentyn Petrov, an official at the Security 
Service of Ukraine (Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrayiny, or SBU) noted: “Ukrainian hackers are well-
known in the world. Our country is a potential source of cyber threats to other countries” [80]. 
A notable example is the Zeus malware, which likely originated from the country (Table 1). In 
2010, the FBI’s cybercrime operations, code-named Trident Breach, broke up an international 
ring using Zeus, which stole US$ 70 million from the payroll accounts of small businesses and 
local government in the U.S. More than half of the sum reportedly went to Ukraine [80]. There 
were arrests in four countries, including 39 in the U.S. Most individuals detained were 
international students who acted as mules. 
Western targets 
 
Cyber gangs traced to FSU&CEE have allegedly stolen substantial amount of money from 
Western businesses and consumers. According to the Romanian police, over 80 % of online 
frauds originating from Romania targets U.S. consumers and businesses. One estimate suggests 
that U.S. consumers and businesses lose about US$ 1 billion to Romania-based cybercriminals. 
Criminal syndicates in FSU&CEE have mastered several ways of defrauding banks. U.S. banks 
are estimated to lose US$ 1 billion a year [33]. A study of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation indicated that cybercrimes associated with FSU&CEE cost U.S. companies and their 
banks over US$ 15 billion during 2002–11 [72]. As an example, in 2009, the Michigan-based 
Experi-Metal lost US$ 1.9 million from bank accounts. Cybercriminals transferred funds to 
Russia, Estonia and other countries in 93 payments [72]. In December 2011, a Ukrainian general, 
a Moldavian and an Israeli were arrested in Romania for allegedly stealing banking credentials of 
at least two organizations and laundering funds to fake companies. They stole US$ 1 million 
from Minneapolis-based Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics [56]. 
Predatory groups in foreign markets 
 
International cybercriminals’ greatest vulnerabilities arguably lie in obtaining the crime proceeds 
such as extortion ransom money or stolen funds [5]. One way to increase portability of crime 
proceeds would be to establish what McDougal [69] refers as “a predatory group” in foreign 
markets. 
Beginning the late 2008, the creators of Zeus reportedly employed an estimated 3,000 money 
mules in the U.S., the U.K. and other economies. They stole banking credentials and moved 
money from the compromised accounts into hundreds of accounts opened under false identities. 
Many of the mules were U.S. residents recruited through social networking sites, newspapers and 
other channels, who were lured into work-at-home jobs [90]. The stolen funds were often 
transferred using money transfer agencies such as Western Union. 
The New York-based gang was operated by a Russian citizen who supplied the mules with fake 
identity documents, and managed their activities. The gang allegedly cleared over US$ 3 million 
from victim corporations [55]. In September 2010, the U.S. attorney’s office in New York 
charged 37 defendants. Four of the defendants were “managers” of the operation, “a few others” 
were recruiters, and the rest were money mules [45]. Some of them had come to the U.S. solely 
to engage in frauds. 
British police also arrested 20 people for using Zeus and 13 of them were jailed in October 2011. 
Two Ukrainians were major players, who allegedly stole US$ 4.5 million in 6 months. The main 
kingpin operated from Ukraine, who acquired stolen credentials and coordinated the theft. The 
“man on the ground” was in the U.K. [28]. 
Similarly, most of Romanian cybercriminals’ auction fraud victims are in the Western countries. 
In 2006, U.S. law-enforcement agencies arrested an eBay fraud ring in Chicago, which was 
traced to have connections with cybercriminals in Pitesti, Romania [112]. 
The operations of the money mules may warrant elaboration. Some transactions involve mules in 
multiple countries. In a case reported in Sullivan [100], an online CD and DVD retailer paid a 
ransom of US$ 40,000 to a hacker based in Balakov, Russia. The fund was wired to 10 accounts 
in Latvia. The mules then rewired the money to St. Petersburg and Moscow. Another set of 
mules brought the money to Balakov. The computer server used to launch the attacks was in 
Houston. 
The push and pull factors related to cybercrimes 
 
Since prior researchers have emphasized the needs for exploration of causes and motivations of 
consumer frauds [47] and the structure of opportunity associated with various crimes [13], in this 
section, we seek to find answers to the following questions in the context of cyber-frauds 
associated with FSU&CEE: What are the push and pull factors for individuals engaged in the 
cybercrime industry in the region? Among the important pull factors that encourage individuals 
to engage in cybercrimes, it is important to understand the region’s endowment in IT skills and 
existing criminal networks. Push factors which motivate going outside the formal economy 
include a small and under-developed IT industry. 
Criminal networks expanding to the online world 
 
Organized cybercrime groups in FSU&CEE are able to benefit from criminal activity due to their 
endowment with superior criminal skills. As evident in cyber-extortion cases, such skills are 
transferable to the cyber-world. Many cybercrime victims are extorted by these groups. In the 
late 2003 and early 2004, the FBI and National Hi-Tech Crime units discovered that hackers 
employed by FSU&CEE organized crime groups launched a DOS attack on Worldpay System 
that affected thousands of online casinos. For instance, in 2004, online sports books, 
BETWWTS, reportedly paid East Europe-based extortionists thousands of dollars [107]. They 
carefully plan attacks in terms of the target, the time, and the amount of extortion. They often 
demand much less than the costs to repair a hacked site. Many firms choose to comply with their 
demand rather than taking the risk of attack and losing customers and profits. 
Cybercrime firms in these economies combine a sophisticated mix of technical and social 
engineering competencies. For instance, it is reported that, Romanian scammers have hired 
English speakers to improve communications, which helped them appear legitimate [36]. 
Problems such as broken English, typos, grammar, misspellings and wrong tenses that made 
phishing emails less convincing are no longer a problem. Davis and Joan [27] observes: “In 
Eastern Europe and especially in the former Soviet republics, organized criminal groups are 
perfecting phishing with breathtaking speed. Not only have the pitches become more convincing 
(the spelling and grammatical errors that belied early phishing e-mails are less frequent, for 
instance), but the technology used to trap your account numbers and passwords has grown 
viciously sophisticated”. Rock Phish, which was believed to be a Russian group, was estimated 
to be responsible for over half of all phishing sites worldwide sent convincing messages in 
perfect English as well as French, German and Dutch [39]. It used counterfeit designs of brand 
logos and styles of financial companies, retailers, and government agencies [22]. 
In many FSU&CEE economies, crime seems to pay because the benefits often far outweigh the 
costs. It was reported that in the post-Soviet years of the 1990s, many top athletes joined the 
organized crime industry after retirement [80]. Former law enforcement agents are also allegedly 
engaged in organized crimes. After the fall of the communism, Bulgaria’s secret service agents 
were accused of being engaged in organized crimes [21]. Russian hack rings are allegedly 
operated by former KGB agents [11]. Russian organized crime groups arguably include 
“underworld” criminals as well as “overworld” figures from the former Communist Party [82]. 
IT skills 
 
Students in FSU&CEE are good at mathematics, physics, and computer science. Consider the 
U.S. National Security Agency-backed “hacking” competition of 2009. Four thousand two 
hundred programmers from all over the world participated in algorithm coding and other 
contests. Of the finalists, ten were from Russia, and two were from the U.S. [23]. Speaking of the 
emphasis on mathematics in Romania, a scientist in Bucharest put the issue this way: “The 
respect for math is inside every family, even simple families, who are very proud to say their 
children are good at mathematics” [112]. 
High school students with computer literacy reportedly engage in seemingly harmless activities 
such as cracking a licensed program or breaking into SN accounts of classmates [106]. In many 
cases, these activities provide the foot-into-the- door to financially motivated cybercrimes. 
In the FSU economies, computer specialists gained experience in “disassembling, examining and 
hacking American systems to see how they worked in order to make them functional on Soviet 
systems” [93]. Hackers in FSU economies arguably possess capability to do sophisticated attacks 
with limited resources. Observers have noted that Russian hackers are highly skilled and “subtle” 
[104] and know how to “get in and out without a trace” [107]. Specialized training schools 
reportedly teach hacking skills. Eighty-two percent of respondents participating in a worldwide 
poll indicated that Russia had the world’s best computer hackers. The corresponding proportion 
was 5 % for the U.S. [107]. 
Lack of legitimate jobs 
 
FSU&CEE economies are too small to absorb the existing talent, which has forced educated 
workforce to the electronic underground. They lack an equivalent of the U.S. Silicon Valley. 
Beyond all that, a 1998 financial crash left many programmers unemployed [93]. A lack of 
English language proficiency limits access to the Western labor market [80]. 
In Russia and other FSU&CEE economies, top university graduate are reportedly paid by 
organized crime groups up to ten times as much as from legitimate jobs [24,108]. A self-
described hacker from Moscow confessed: “Hacking is one of the few good jobs left here” [107]. 
Regarding computer attacks originating from Romania, the U.S.-based Internet Fraud Complaint 
Center noted: “Frustrated with the employment possibilities offered in Romania, some of the 
world’s most talented computer students are exploiting their talents online.” 
Some with employment in legitimate companies have also found attractive to join the cybercrime 
industry. In January 2012, Microsoft announced that a former employee of an antivirus software 
firm was allegedly involved in writing or creating the Kelihos botnet [10]. At one point, the 
Kelihos botnet infected 41,000 computers worldwide and sent 3.8 billion spam e-mails a day 
[75]. Likewise, analysts suspected that hackers in Ukraine worked with top ISPs [80]. 
High likelihood of getting away with cybercrimes 
 
As is the case of white-collar crimes [105], cybercrimes are complex and require substantial 
amounts of investigative and prosecutorial efforts. Resource limitations are thus of particular 
concern for cybercrimes. In Russia, for instance, most hackers are young, highly educated, and 
work independently and thus do not fit the conventional Police profiles of criminals [58]. 
Many FSU&CEE economies lack law enforcement agencies with high-tech crime-fighting 
abilities, which have led to cybercriminals’ high likelihood of getting away with cybercrimes. 
For instance, consider Ramnicu Valcea town of Romania, where a large number of eBay fraud 
cases originate. At one point in 2005, two law-enforcement officers in the town were dealing 
with over 200 eBay cases with a 9-year-old computer with no Internet connection. To go online, 
they used the cafes that were used by cybercriminals [112]. Likewise, eBay’s Albena Spasova, 
who worked in promoting law reform in Moldova and Bulgaria, was quoted as saying: “Even in 
2001, I was meeting judges who thought cyber-crime was someone stealing a computer” [112]. 
Government agencies are also characterized by an apparent lack of ability to defend themselves 
cyber-attacks. There is a lack of knowledgeable computer experts in law enforcement agencies. 
When the popular Ukrainian file-sharing website, EX.ua was shut down in February 2012 on 
alleged piracy issues, governmental websites, including SBU’s web portal experienced cyber-
attacks [80]. 
Observers note that since Russian cybercriminals mostly target banks and institutions in the West 
rather than in Russia, it is less of a concern for local law enforcement. To take an example, while 
Russia has strict laws controlling the media, Hacker Magazine published an article in August 
2010, which explained how to crack the NATO website, with screenshots and step-by-step 
instructions [96]. 
Case studies of FSU&CEE-based cybercrime firms 
 
Case 1: rove digital 
 
An example of a highly globalized cybercrime firm is Tartu, Estonia-based Rove Digital (RD), 
which was seemingly legitimate IT Company. According to a Manhattan federal court 
indictment in November 2011, an alleged international crime ring associated with RD used 
malware to hijack more than 4 million computers in over 100 countries. When victims visited 
certain websites or downloaded software to view videos online, the malware was installed on the 
computers [17]. 
It was one of the biggest criminal-owned botnets. The ring included six Estonians and one 
Russian and was estimated to generate at least US$ 14 million in profits. About 500,000 of the 
hijacked computers were in the U.S. including those used by educational institutions, nonprofit 
organizations and government agencies such as NASA. The malware had infected the websites 
of about half of the Fortune 500 companies and at least 26 U.S. government agencies [7]. 
According to Media reports, Vladimir Tshastsin, the alleged ringleader transferred some of his 
assets to his father, who was Estonia’s 283rd richest person [6]. The law-enforcement operations 
in 2011 also led to a seizure of the gang’s 150 properties. 
RD and shell companies 
 
The crime ring was organized and operated as a traditional business but profited illegally. Its 
subsidiaries included Esthost, a webhosting services reseller, Estdomains, Cernel, and 
UkrTelegroup and many less well known shell companies. RD and its shell companies had faced 
legal problems and received media attention earlier. For instance, Esthost went offline, when the 
San Francisco-based Atrivo, which hosted Esthost’s servers, was suspected to engage in criminal 
activities. RD was forced to stop the hosting services offered by Esthost [35].RD learned its 
lesson. The company expanded its command-and-control (C&C) infrastructure all over the 
world. It also moved a significant proportion of the servers from Atrivo to Pilosoft datacenter in 
New York [35]. 
In 2008, Estdomains also lost its accreditation from the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN) as its owner; Tsastsin was convicted in Estonia. Tsastsin was charged by 
an Estonian court for online fraud, money laundering and forging of documentation [6]. Despite 
RD’s heavy involvement in cybercrimes, the company operated openly for many years. 
The fraud scheme 
 
RD’s click hijacking scheme started in 2007 and ran until November 2011. The group had 100 
C&C servers worldwide including one each in New York and Chicago [92]. The ring also 
claimed that it ran legitimate online advertising firms and the schemes principally operated 
through RD. 
The “click hijacking” malware changed Domain Name Server (DNS) system and users of 
infected computers were given an incorrect address and unknowingly redirected to rogue 
computer servers controlled by the gang [48]. A simple way to understand the DNS system 
would be to view it as the Internet’s “built-in phone book”. Note that in order to find a website 
such as Google, Yahoo or Wikipedia, a computer reaches out to the DNS to find a numerical 
address also known as the IP address. The malware also prevented victims from connecting with 
their antivirus software providers and updating software. 
Most traditional malware is designed to steal valuable personal information. This scheme was 
different and thus was not easily detected for a long time. Experts considered this as a very 
clever tactic as it manipulated the infrastructure of the Web involved in doing one of the most 
popular activities: display advertising [92]. Part of the problem also lies in the fact that some 
legitimate companies benefit from such frauds. 
The indictment describes several examples of cyber-frauds including two principle strategies: 
traffic redirection and ad replacement: 
Traffic redirection 
 
The virus altered search engine results so consumers who clicked links of companies such as 
Apple’s iTunes, Netflix, IRS.gov, www.ESPN.com, Amazon, www.WSJ.com and other popular 
websites would be directed to fake sites designated by them. When a user searched a term, the 
search results would normally return a website but the malware would force a redirect to a 
different website when the user clicked on the link. The indictment cited an example in which 
when a user searched for the “IRS” at www.Yahoo.com and clicked on a link for the Internal 
Revenue Service, the user was redirected to an H&R Block tax preparation website. Likewise, in 
searching “itunes,” the results would display the official website but would take the user to a 
different website purporting to sell Apple software but not affiliated with Apple. Users were 
similarly rerouted to unaffiliated sites when searching for the official websites of Netflix and 
other companies, according to the indictment. 
Users were also redirected to websites dealing with illegal and extra-legal products and services, 
such as those selling fake Louis Vuitton, replica watches and fake anti-virus software. The sites 
to which users were directed would pay a referral fee. 
Ad replacement 
 
When an infected computer was used to visit a website, the malware would replace regular ads 
with other ads from which the criminals would generate revenue through affiliate arrangements 
[31]. They also designed mimicked sites, which are doctored websites of legitimate organizations 
for replacing ads controlled by the hackers. The indictment cited an example: when users clicked 
on an American Express ad for the Plum Card on the Wall Street Journal’s home page, it was 
instantly replaced by an ad for “Fashion Girl LA” [48]. Likewise, the group swapped legitimate 
display ads of Dr. Pepper on www.ESPN.com by a vacation timeshare ad [71]. In addition, 
clicking on these ads would often download malware to the user’s computer. 
Operation ghost click 
 
In November 2011, the scheme was dismantled by U.S. federal agencies with the help of private 
companies and some universities. The two-year FBI investigation was codenamed “Operation 
Ghost Click”. Two data centers in New York City and Chicago were raided by federal agents, 
who seized servers and IP addresses used in the DNS Changer malware and shut down more than 
100 servers [48]. 
The FBI worked closely with the Estonian Police and Border Guard, the Dutch National Police, 
and NASA’s Office of the Inspector General. Trend Micro tracked the activities of RD and its 
subsidiaries and helped the FBI. University of Alabama at Birmingham’s (UAB) Spam Data 
Mine, which contained 550 million junk e-mail messages in its database as of November 2011, 
was used to analyze activities such as targeted versions of phishing (spear phishing), advertising 
fraud, and identity spoofing [70]. Other organizations helping in the operations included Georgia 
Tech University, the Internet Systems Consortium, security firm Mandiant, Spamhaus, Team 
Cymru and the DNS Changer Working Group. In February 2012, an Estonian court ruled that 
Estonia can extradite four persons to the U.S. The court had made similar decisions on two other 
persons [7]. 
Case 2: innovative marketing Ukraine (IMU) 
 
IMU was a pioneer of fake antivirus software, also known as scareware, founded by a Swedish, a 
Canadian and an American. IMU exhibited many features of a legitimate company. The 
organization and its employees had LinkedIn profiles [81]. It was incorporated in Belize and its 
main offices were located in Ukraine’s capital, Kiev. McAfee’s Dirk Kollberg estimated that 
IMU employed more than 600 employees in Kiev and subsidiaries in India, Poland, Canada, the 
U.S., Argentina and other countries in posts such as receptionists, financial managers, 
webmasters and R&D engineers [81]. Paget [81] found 396 employees’ names, analyzed the 
professional records of 180 of them. 100 of them worked for at least a year. Most were college 
students [37]. 
Business models of scareware programs are centered on infusing fear and anxiety to sell fake 
software. A typical scareware would pretend to scan a computer for malware, and would tell the 
user that the machine is infected. In IMU’s case, the goal is to persuade the victim to voluntarily 
provide credit card information to pay US$ 50–80 for the scareware. 
Scareware has become one of the fastest-growing, and most prevalent, types of internet fraud 
[37]. According McAfee there was a 400 % increase in scareware incidents in 2009. The 
company predicted that scareware would infect about 1 million computers a day in 2010 
generating illegal global profits of over US$ 300 million [67]. According to Symantec, there 
were 250 varieties scareware products in 2009, which were installed in tens of millions of 
computers [87]. 
The modus operandi 
 
IMU’s products were superficially similar to genuine anti-virus products. For instance, its Win 
Antivirus looked like Microsoft security software. Another product, DriveCleaner, identified 179 
visits to adult websites no matter which computer it was installed on. The fake software was 
designed to tell users that their PCs were working properly once they had paid. IMU relied fear 
and intimidation to assure compliance rather than product sophistication. 
IMU invested heavily in call center facilities in Ukraine, India and the U.S., which responded to 
about 2 million calls in 2008 [41]. When people made calls to complain, agents would ‘guide’ 
them through the steps needed to make those messages appear [37]. In many cases, that also 
required disabling legitimate anti-virus software. A McAfee researcher listened to digitized audio 
recordings of customer service calls that IMU kept on its servers at the Ukraine offices. The 
researcher found that most customers seemed to be happy and satisfied at the end of the call [37]. 
IMU hired many young employees, who did not seem to care about ethical behaviors, practices 
and standards. They knowingly refused to acknowledge the scareware’s harm to consumers. A 
former IMU employee, who later joined a Kiev bank, put the issue this way: “When you are just 
20, you don’t think a lot about ethics. I had a good salary and I know that most employees also 
had pretty good salaries” [37]. 
According to a McAfee researcher, IMU received approximately 4.5 million orders in the 11 
months of 2008, which amounted to US180millionattherateofUS 40 each. IMU sold programs in 
at least two dozen countries [37]. 
IMU also created dummy ad agencies to place bogus and innocent-looking ads for reputed 
businesses without their permission on popular websites. Ads for businesses were placed on the 
websites of National Hockey League, The Economist, Major League Baseball, Priceline, Career 
Builder, the National Association of Realtors, E-Harmony and others [67]. A click on such ads 
triggered automatic bogus scans, which showed that the PCs were virus-infected. The PCs made 
sales pitch involving false promises for a clean-up and directed users to purchase IMU’s 
scareware [1]. 
IMU’s affiliates and business partners 
 
In an attempt to ‘recruit’ business partners (e.g., credit card processors), IMU created 
subsidiaries, which were designed to hide its identity. A high proportion of IMU’s victims 
complained to their credit card companies to obtain refunds on purchases, which deteriorated the 
relationships with merchant banks that processed the transactions. IMU was forced to switch 
from a bank in Canada to one in Bahrain. 
In 2005, the Bahrain-based Bank of Bahrain & Kuwait terminated ties with an IMU subsidiary. 
Then IMU had no credit card processor for 5 months. Following that it established a relationship 
with Singapore’s DBS Bank, which showed willingness to handle IMU accounts. DBS Bank 
processed IMU’s tens of millions of dollars in backlogged payments [37]. 
For infecting each machine, IMU paid affiliates 10 cents and generated average returns in the 
range of US$ 2–5 through software sale and product promotion. Affiliates loaded software by 
hijacking legitimate websites, setting up corrupt sites for spreading viruses, attacking social 
networking sites and other methods. One affiliate recruiting site, www.earning4u.com, 
reportedly paid US$ 6–180 for every 1,000 infected PCs [37]. 
IMU and its affiliates also rewarded the top performers. Panda Security reported that it found 
pictures of a party organized in March 2008 in Montenegro by KlikVIP, an IMU affiliate, to 
reward scareware installers. One picture showed a briefcase full of euros given to the top 
performer [37]. 
The fallout 
 
More than 1,000 people complained against IMU to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
[41]. The FTC’s investigation lasted more than a year, which led to a federal lawsuit to shut 
down IMU. Reportedly IMU’s servers were not password-protected. McAfee’s Kollberg 
collected more than 67 GB of data from IMU servers [81]. Kollberg forwarded the information 
to the FTC and the FBI, which helped build the case against IMU. 
According to a May 2010 announcement by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the three people charged 
in the IMU case allegedly cheated customers in 60 countries with about US$ 100 million [74]. 
The U.S. government retrieved US$ 117,000 by settling charges against one of the defendants, 
who ran a customer support center in Cincinnati [37]. Profiles posted on LinkedIn indicated that 
some of the former IMU employees were working at leading banks, consulting companies and 
other Kiev-based antivirus companies [81]. 
Case 3: Russian business network (RBN) 
 
RBN allegedly offered spyware, Trojans, and botnet command and control systems and also 
laundered money [108]. The virus creation tool Mpack was its flagship product, which was 
designed to extract data from infected PCs. It was packaged with personal tech support from 
RBN and cost US$ 500–1,000. Mpack exploited known software security holes in browsers [54]. 
Cybercriminals hacked websites and installed malicious programs created with Mpack. When 
someone visited such sites with a browser unequipped with software security updates, a 
password-stealing program was installed on the visitor’s computers. It then scanned the 
computer for vulnerabilities [50]. The stolen data were forwarded to a “drop site” in RBN 
servers. Mpack monitored the success of its operation through various metrics on its online, 
password protected control, and management consoles [102]. 
RBN also sold website hosting services to criminals. Krebs [54] quoted an analyst with the anti-
virus firm, Kaspersky Lab: “They make money on the services they provide . . . the illegal 
activities are all carried out by groups that buy hosting services . . . .RBN, . . . does not violate 
the law. From a legal point of view, they are clean.” 
Observers noted that RBN seemingly had a political protections [108]. According to the Serious 
Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), RBN allegedly bribed local police, judges, and government 
officials [66]. An Economist.com article [29] noted: 
Despite the attention it is receiving from Western law enforcement agencies, RBN is not on the 
run. Its users are becoming more sophisticated, moving for example from simple phishing (using 
fake e-mails) to malware known as “trojans” that sit inside a victim’s computer collecting 
passwords and other sensitive information and sending them to their criminal masters. 
RBN stopped operations in 2007. Some analysts suspected that “whatever protection RBN 
enjoyed was withdrawn because the group had overreached itself” [30]. It was also suggested 
that the group operating RBN may have shifted its operations to Asian countries [15]. 
Understanding FSU&CEE Economies’ approaches to cybercrime and cyber-security: 
institutional and IR/IPE explanations 
 
The low prosecution and conviction rates of cyber-offenders in some FSU&CEE economies and 
regional variation in such rates can largely be explained by two different but interrelated 
phenomena: modernization of legislative and institutional frameworks and cooperation and 
integration with the West. As presented in Table 2, FSU&CEE economies differ in their 
membership status in various supranational organizations, which partly explains their varying 
response to cybercrimes. 
Table 2 
Membership status of FSU&CEE economies in various supranational organizations 
Supranational 
organizations 
Member countries 
Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
OECD Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
EU 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia 
Supranational 
organizations Member countries 
NATO 
Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
Signatories in the Council of 
Europe Convention on 
Cybercrime 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, 
Serbia , Slovak Republic, Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine 
 
As Table 3 indicates, the degree of integration with the West contributes to but does not fully 
explain the modernization of broader institutional frameworks. This can be illustrated by 
comparing Russia and Ukraine. While Russia has established distance with the West, Ukraine 
has shown more willingness to cooperate and integrate (Table 3). The Council of Europe 
Convention on Cybercrime (CoECoC) has been ratified by Ukraine. Since 2009, the FBI has 
stationed a special agent at the U.S. Embassy in Kiev for assisting cybercrime investigation [51]. 
The Ukrainian law enforcement agencies have also cooperated with the West. In 2010, the SBU 
arrested five alleged kingpins of a criminal group, which stole US$ 70 million from U.S. bank 
accounts [80]. Likewise, formal NATO-Ukraine relations started in 1997 with the Charter on a 
Distinctive Partnership and establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC). Ukraine is 
also showing interest in, and enthusiasm for a deeper European integration. 
Table 3 
A comparison of FSU&CEE economies in terms of the modernization of institutional 
frameworks and integration with the West 
Degree of modernization of broader legislative and 
institutional frameworks ⟹ 
High Low 
Willingness to cooperate and integrate with the West ⇓ 
High 
OECD and/or EU members (e.g., 
Estonia, Romania) Ukraine 
Low 
No example among the economies 
studied in this paper 
SCO 
economies 
 
Despite the progress, some argue that Ukraine is slipping into reverse gear in democracy related 
matters due to the institutional inertia [18]. President Viktor Yanukovych’s current government 
is not seeking NATO membership. Critics also argue that Yanukovych’s government has done 
little to further European integration. Despite international cooperation, crime fighting efforts are 
hindered by underdeveloped and outdated institutional framework. For instance, the five 
kingpins detained in 2010 were freed immediately without a court trial. It is also argued that 
foreigners also account for international cybercrimes originated from Ukraine [95]. Corruption 
has enabled and generally encouraged them to obtain the right to reside and operate criminal 
activities in the country. The IMU case provides evidence to support this hypothesis. 
Just like the white-collar cases [105], cybercrime cases are complex and thus require substantial 
resources to investigate and prosecute. Using the system capacity argument, while most white-
collar crimes have a substantial cost to the local economy and thus their low indictment rates due 
to limited resources are unjustifiable [105], this may not be the case for cybercrimes associated 
with FSU&CEE. This is because most cybercrimes associated with these economies target 
international victims and cost little to the local economy. Likewise, while caseload pressure is 
obviously a concern [86], it is evident that the lack of incentives and interest in fighting 
cybercrimes originated from the region has become a more serious issue. 
As noted above, resource limitations are of particular concern for investigating and prosecuting 
cybercrimes due to their complexity [105]. However, a significant proportion of cybercrime 
activities originated from the FSU&CEE harm the West. According to leaked WikiLeaks 
documents, U.S. diplomatic cables shed light on the cybercrime industry in Bulgaria, which is 
arguably one of the “growth areas” of criminal activities with a potential to have an impact on 
the U.S. if political and legal institutions fail to take effective countermeasures. This indicates 
the importance of cyber-security in IR/IPE as suggested by prior research [60,61]. The West is 
also in a position to expend more resources to investigate cybercrimes and has a vested interest 
in helping FSU&CEE increase system capacity and legal response. 
Formal institutions 
 
At the outset it must be noted that, many FSU&CEE economies have enacted laws and 
regulations to enhance cyber-security and there have been some indicators of enforcement 
success. In an attempt to control spam, Russia introduced regulations to tighten up domain 
registrations in 2010. The new regulations require copies of passports or legal registration papers 
for businesses to register a .ru domain. Before this regulation came into effect, domains were set 
up without any checks [65]. Similarly, the Romanian Directorate for Investigating Organized 
Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT) reported that it investigated 1,157 cybercrime cases in 2010. 
Likewise, in March 2012, Ukraine shut down the website of VX Heavens, a forum operating for 
a long-time to exchange tips on writing malware [51]. 
Despite the progress, unclear, outdated or impractical regulatory frameworks pose significant 
challenges. In Russia and Ukraine, it is unconstitutional to extradite their citizens to other 
countries [79]. Some countries’ laws fail to account for the realities of cybercrimes. For instance, 
Romanian law requires cybercrime victims to send police a signed complaint and be represented 
at the hearing [112]. It is thus impractical for foreign victims to bring a case in the Romanian 
courts. Some government officials have publicly recognized the need for modernization of the 
Soviet-era legislation and institutional structure. 
A piecemeal and fragmented approach to law enforcement is also reflected in cyber-security. The 
Interior Ministry’s Directorate K is the lead agency to deal with cyber-security. The lack of 
cooperation and turf wars between the Directorate K and local agencies are clearly visible [109]. 
There was also an accusation that Russian cybercriminals have been co-opted by the intelligence 
agencies. The intelligence agencies allegedly use criminals’ expertise or their networks of virus-
infected computers for political purposes [53]. Many believe that whoever opposes the 
government and supports the opposition faces cyber-attacks. Russian websites that are related to 
organizations with anti-government positions have been victims of DDoS attacks. A 2002 attack 
on Kavkaz.org, the website of Chechen separatist fighters, was among the first indications of 
such approach, in which students of the Tomsk city were reportedly involved. The local 
department of the Federal Security Service was apparently aware of the perpetrators, which 
issued a press release describing the attack as an “expression of their position as citizens, one 
worthy of respect” [97]. Since then the so called “hacker patriots” have allegedly launched 
DDoS attacks against independent media sources in Russia as well as at government agencies in 
Estonia, Georgia, and Lithuania [97]. 
Informal institutions 
 
North [77] noted that “although formal rules may change overnight as the result of political and 
judicial decisions, informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are 
much more impervious to deliberate policies”. Cultural acceptability of hacking also deserves 
mention [85]. Many economies in the region have no negative connotation of activities such as 
hacking and piracy. Actually, the opposite holds. Blau [16] documented how a Russian hacker-
turned-teacher and his friends hacked programs and distributed them for free during their 
childhood: “It was like our donation to society, it was a form of honor; [we were] like Robin 
Hood bringing programs to people. 
Russian elites feel some degree of sympathy for the cybercriminals. Dmitry Zakharov, director 
of Communications at The Russian Association of Electronic Communications (RAEC) noted: 
“The problems at the moment is that we are not able to offer talented technology people jobs so 
they get involved in illegal activity. Not many want to be gangsters but Russia is relatively 
young as a capitalist economy and there are not enough normal and civilised occupations” [65]. 
Russian cybercriminals thus also enjoy a degree of informal legitimacy. Experts also say that 
programs to raise awareness and educate the youth are largely missing [26]. 
Variation across FSU&CEE economies in cooperation and integration with the west 
 
For some FSU&CEE economies, international pressures have led to the modernization of 
Soviet–era legislative framework and institutional structures. Economies such as Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia were constantly monitored as part of the process 
of attaining memberships of international organizations such as the EU, NATO and the OECD. 
The governments in these economies are becoming more effective in fighting crimes thanks to 
broader institutional changes such as Slovenia’s establishment of a coordinating anti-corruption 
commission and specialized law enforcement units to combat serious economic crimes and 
Estonia’s principles of “Honest State” program started in 2004, which has a number of 
components to reduce corruptions. 
A related point is that these international organizations have well developed mechanisms and 
infrastructure for strengthening member countries’ cyber-security orientations as well as 
improving international cooperation. For instance, the Italy-based European Electronic Crimes 
Task Force, which has dedicated personnel from the countries involved to investigate and 
prosecute cybercrimes, provides a forum for law enforcement agencies, the private sector and 
academia from the U.S. and EU nations. 
The FBI announced in 2009 that it would permanently base a computer crime expert in Estonia 
to help fight international cybercrimes [4]. Similarly, Romania’s DIICOT reported that it 
exchanged information with law enforcement agencies from more than 50 countries including 
the U.K.’s SOCA and the U.S. FBI [26]. There has been a close collaboration between the 
Romanian police and FBI agents since the early 2000s. As of 2008, Romania’s national police 
and the FBI arrested 90 Romanians engaged in cybercrimes. Western multinationals have also 
helped to strengthen cyber-security related institutions. To take an example, eBay has been 
educating Romanian prosecutors about cybercrimes including explaining to a judge using 
layman’s language [112]. 
On the other hand, the environments of tension, distrust, and conflict, which characterized the 
U.S.-Soviet cold war relationship, have been the typical features of U.S.-Russia relationship on 
cyber-security. This must be seen against the backdrop of the emergence of cyber-security as a 
hot-button issue in international discourses [60,61]. Some U.S. observers believe that Russia has 
trained hackers in Internet warfare and the country is systematically probing the computer 
networks in the U.S. to find weaknesses [14,64]. Russia, on the other hane, is arguably 
concerned about the U.S. superiority in the cyberspace [2,68]. The two countries have planned a 
dialogue which would include discussions about how each side’s military views the Internet and 
an effort to establish a hot line that could be used during cyber-security crises [91]. 
The U.S.-Russia difference in the approach to cyberspace is also reflected in their memberships 
in different international alliances related to cyber-security. Russia and its allies (Table 2) 
consider important to focus on the broader problem of information security rather than the 
narrower cyber-security. In 2008, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Agreement in 
the field of International Information Security emphasized on and expressed concerns about the 
‘digital gap’ between the West and the East. The SCO economies and Western countries also 
exhibit a wide divergence over issues related to Internet control. The SCO economies have been 
particularly concerned about the West’s monopolization in ICT products and less developed 
countries’ dependence on the West. They like to control information that is likely to provoke the 
three “evils” (terrorism, extremism, separatism). They also consider important to prevent other 
nations from using technologies to disrupt economic, social and political stability and national 
security. For instance, Russia arguably is concerned about the dissidents’ and human rights 
groups’ mobilization on the Internet and possible “non-violent Color Revolutions” and the 
West’s ability to support such mobilization [2,68]. Western countries, on the other hand, 
maintain that too much government regulations may harm cyber-security and emphasize the 
importance of the private sector [52]. 
SCO states believe that the CoECoC fails to take into account a number of issues and would 
create adverse impacts such as cyber-security abuses and cyber-conflict. Russia’s SCO National 
Coordinator described the CoECoC as less than satisfactory [52]. Russia has rejected the 
CoECoC arguing that it violates the country’s Constitution by permitting foreign law 
enforcement agencies to conduct Internet searches inside its borders. 
In 1998, Russia first introduced a draft resolution to the U.N. Security Council, entitled 
“Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of security”. In 
September 2011, China, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan submitted a draft code of the 
International Code of Conduct for Information Security before the 66th UN General Assembly 
Meeting. 
The above differences have contributed to the lack of U.S.-Russia cooperation in cyber-security. 
Russia has signed agreements to help the U.S. in investigating some crimes but not on 
cybercrimes. An example to illustrate this would be the FBI’s handling of two Russian hackers in 
2000, who were lured to the U.S. with job offers. FBI Agents also downloaded data from the 
hackers’ computers in Chelyabinsk, Russia. In 2002, Russia filed hacking charges against the 
FBI arguing that it was illegal to download data from computers in Russia [59]. Likewise, in 
2001, the U.S. DoJ requested the assistance from Russian authorities, but there was no response 
[63]. 
Subsequently some degree of cooperation emerged between Russia and the West. In 2004, 
collaboration between British and Russian police led to arrests of an online extortion ring’s 
members accused of blackmailing online sports betting websites that cost British companies US$ 
120 million [98]. In 2005, U.S. law-enforcement officials reported that they received help from 
their Russian counterparts on about one out of six cybercrime-related requests [20]. Russian 
cyber-security agents were also trained in the U.S. [101]. Perhaps the most important sign of 
cooperation was Russia’s arrest of a St. Petersburg-based hacker, who was indicted by the U.S. 
for stealing US$ 9 million from the Royal Bank of Scotland in 2006. However, the U.S. 
expressed frustration and disappointment when he received only a six-year suspended sentence 
[73,96]. 
When Vladimir Zdorovenin, a Russian citizen was extradited to the U.S. by Swiss authorities for 
his alleged involvement in security fraud, computer hacking and ID theft in January 2012, 
Russian authorities complained that the Swiss and U.S. authorities did not notify them. A 
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman commented: “Unfortunately, this is not the first time when 
U.S. special services organize the detention of our nationals in third countries, often on dubious 
grounds and by provocative methods. What we’re looking at is the unlawful exterritorial 
application of U.S. laws against Russian nationals” [88]. Likewise, in response to U.S.-based 
security researchers’ findings that a group of five men based in St. Petersburg, Russia was 
responsible for spreading the Koobface worm, the Russian Embassy in the U.S. reacted that it 
had no information regarding that group. It further noted that U.S. law enforcement officials had 
never contacted the embassy about the group [89]. 
As a further example, investigation conducted by Facebook and other independent researchers 
indicated that five men based in St. Petersburg, Russia were responsible for spreading the 
Koobface worm on Facebook and other social networking sites. The researchers’ study revealed 
that the group made at least US$ 2 million a year during its three and a half years of its existence 
[89]. Facebook and IT security firms provided detailed intelligence to the authorities in the West 
and in Russia. However, no action was taken against the Koobface gang [111]. 
Discussion and implications 
 
In this paper, we applied and extended theories in white-collar crimes in the context of 
international cybercrimes. A theoretical contribution is the observation that emerging economies’ 
international cooperation and integration would help them enhance system capacity and law 
enforcement performance to deal with cybercrime. Another contribution is the demonstration 
that cyber-offenders are less likely to be jurisdictionally shielded in such economies. 
As discussed above, the masterminds in the Zeus case and the creators of Koobface were 
jurisdictionally shielded in Ukraine and Russia respectively. Why Russia- and Ukraine-based 
cyber-offenders are often not criminally prosecuted is not because alternative sanctions are 
applied as predicted by the alternative sanctions argument [94], but no sanctions are actually 
imposed. In this regard, while the organized crime groups which include “underworld” criminals 
as well as “overworld” figures from the former Communist Party are in “organizationally 
shielded” positions as proposed by organizational advantage argument [46], most international 
cybercriminals can “jurisdictionally shield” themselves just by operating from economies with a 
low degree of cooperation and integration with the West. Moreover, the primary reason they are 
not prosecuted is not because of the difficulty in obtaining direct evidence against them as 
argued by the system capacity approach [105]. This is in a large part due to outdated regulative 
institutions and the unwillingness of law enforcement agencies to pursue cyber-fraud cases as the 
criminals mainly victimize foreigners. When cybercriminals from Russia travel to many of the 
Western countries, however, they may no longer hide behind the jurisdictional shield of Western 
law enforcement authorities. 
Cyber-security has become one of the most prominent IR challenges for Russia and the U.S. 
Allegations and counter-allegations, which have been persistent themes in dialogues and 
discourses in the U.S.-Russia relationship in cyber-security, can be linked to the lack of an 
extensive cooperation. Despite some progress in the past, the Russia-U.S. cooperation has been 
on ice for some time. U.S. law enforcement agencies seem to think that Russian authorities are 
often indifferent and uncooperative in fighting cybercrimes. This is in sharp contrast to the 
deeper and stronger collaborations and partnerships between the U.S. and EU countries. 
As noted above, cybercrime cases are complex and thus require substantial resources to 
prosecute. Using the system capacity argument, while most white-collar crimes have a 
substantial cost to the local economy and thus their low indictment rates due to limited resources 
are unjustifiable [105], this may not be the case for cybercrimes, most of which, as noted above, 
target international victims and thus cost little to the local economy. 
FSU&CEE economies’ system capacity to deal with cybercrime is a matter of concern for the 
governments as well as private sector players in the West. Western countries have also provided 
cyber-security related resources, training and expertise that have helped enhance the system 
capacity of some countries. Private sector players that are affected by cybercrimes associated 
with FSU&CEE economies also investigate such crimes. For some economies in the region, 
however, incentives and pressures have not been significant enough to overcome the institutional 
inertia. 
While the West faces significant jurisdictional challenges in investigating and prosecuting 
international cybercriminals, such challenges are more pronounced in dealing with economies 
with low degrees of modernization of institutional frameworks and/or low degree of cooperation 
and integration with the West. For instance, in Estonia and Romania, which are among the 
countries most integrated with the west (Table 2), cybercriminals are jurisdictionally “less 
shielded” compared to those in Russia. 
Commenting on the January 2012 extradition of a Russian, who allegedly engaged in cybercrime 
activities, an FBI Assistant Director warned that cybercriminals cannot “hide behind the safety 
and anonymity of a Russian IP address” and they would be brought to justice [34]. This probably 
is an over-statement, however in light of the fact that the cybercrime ecosystem in Russia is 
relatively well preserved and virtually untouched. 
Most FSU&CEE economies have enacted cyber-security related laws and regulations. There are 
also some motivated law enforcement officials. Their efforts, however, have been hindered by 
the outdated legislation and lack of resources. What is of concern is the substantial gap between 
law in the book and law in action. More attention needs to be given not just on the narrow 
aspects of cyber-security related legislations, but also on the broader institutional and political 
context in which they are introduced. With increased digitization, FSU&CEE economies 
themselves are likely to be victimized. It is thus more important in the future for the governments 
in these economies to work with the private sector and international partners, addressing 
systemic problems and developing system capacity as well as building specific areas of law 
enforcement. 
Limitations and future research 
 
Several limitations of this research must be recognized in a balanced discussion of its findings. 
One limitation of our study is that, we primarily used English literature sources. This may have 
led to some western bias in defining cybercrime and cyber-security issues in the region as well as 
the institutional contexts. An additional limitation is that it lacks first-hand, primary source 
materials. 
Both the contributions and limitations of this research merit attention and afford directions for 
future work. In future research, scholars need consider academic literature and popular press 
articles published in local languages and collect primary materials from businesses and 
consumers affected by cybercrimes which would help to fully recognize and appreciate differing 
perspectives and viewpoints about cybercrimes associated with the region and the impacts on the 
local economy and society. 
In future conceptual and empirical work scholars need to compare and contrast broader contexts 
associated with cybercrime and cyber-security issues in selected FSU&CEE economies with 
other socialist and post-socialist economies. For instance, while both China and Russia are SCO 
members, they differ widely in terms of the institutional contexts associated with cyber-security. 
This is because a society’s power structure and the vested interests of powerful societal actors 
have an enormous impact on the way crimes in general and cybercrimes in particular are defined, 
conceptualized, theorized, measured, responded to and policed [19,61]. Different social and 
political contexts in China and Russia are likely to translate into different patterns and structures 
of cybercrime and cyber-security landscape. 
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